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BIANNUAL SURVEY

A counterclaim therefore may never appear in a reply. If a
counterclaim could be asserted in a reply, in essence, the court
would be allowing the amendment of the complaint without compelling plaintiff to comply with the requisites of such amendment.
The rule then is clear. Its application, however, can get
somewhat imprecise, since it may be difficult to distinguish between
a counterclaim 18s and an affirmative defense which may always be
included in a reply.
86
This problem is reflected in Rill v. Darling.'
In Rill the
plaintiff brought an action to recover damages for the death of her
husband which, she claimed, was accelerated by defendant's negligence. Defendant's answer alleged a release from the plaintiff.
Plaintiff replied admitting the release, but asked the court to rescind
the agreement.
Plaintiff's claim for rescission in the reply was unchallenged.
Since rescission is an equitable cause of action the plaintiff asserted
a counterclaim.
Apparently defendant's counsel did not object to the reply.
The issue of the case then became the right of the defendant to
have the question of rescission tried by a jury. However, that
issue need never have been reached had defendant's counsel moved
to dismiss the reply for stating a counterclaim.
Amendnent to pleading refused when substantial prejudice results.
CPLR 3025(b), which requires that leave to amend be freely
given, does not preclude the court from exercising its discretion
and denying a defendant's motion for leave to amend his answer.
7
So held the court in Ciccone v. Glenwood Holding Corp.,""
where
plaintiff, a tenant in defendant's building, alleged that she was
injured in December 1961 by a ceiling which collapsed. A complaint was served in February 1963 and in April 1963 defendant
interposed an answer. Defendant moved in August 1964 for leave
to amend his answer so that he could allege that plaintiff was
in his employ at the time of the accident and could, therefore,
receive workmen's compensation. The court denied the defendant's
motion to amend, indicating that plaintiff's right to workmen's
compensation was lost since an action therefor must be brought
within two years of an accident."""
This decision is based upon a firm foundation of cases 1s
which indicate that freedom to amend pleadings is bridled by the
5A counterclaim must state a cause of action.
Misc. 2d 174, 253 N.Y.S.2d 184 (Sup. Ct 1964).
Misc. 2d 273, 253 N.Y.S.2d 576 (Civ. Ct 1964).
21898 N.Y.
WoRK~mq's ComP. LAW § 28.
See, e.g., Zulinsky v. Bradford, 279 App. Div. 765, 108 N.Y.S.2d
756 (2d Dep't 1951); Jennings v. Perkins, 277 App. Div. 1143, 101 N.Y.S.2d
303 (2d Dep't 1950).
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discretion of the court. That discretion will be exercised when
substantial prejudice to the opposing party would result from
amendment.
ARTICLE

31 -

DISCLOSURE

Accident reports are subject to disclosure.
Recently the courts have been faced with the problem of
reconciling the provisions for exemption from disclosure found in
Sections 3101(c) and 3101(d) of the CPLR. CPLR 31 0 1(c)
grants an absolute immunity from disclosure to the work product
of an attorney, whereas 3101(d) provides only that "any writing
• . . created by or for a party . . . in preparation for litigation"

shall be exempt from disclosure unless a special circumstance
exists.190
In Calace v. Battaglia,'91 a personal injury action, the plaintiff
sought disclosure of a statement given by the defendant to his
insurance company. The court, acknowledging the irreconcilable
conflict in case law in this area, 192 held the statement subject to
disclosure. It reasoned that since the policy is to permit maximum
disclosure, "those provisions of CPLR Rule [sic] 3101 which
spell out the exceptions should be narrowly construed to embrace
only what is explicity exempted from disclosure." 193 In accordance
with this liberal policy, it appears that the court did not consider
the statement as either an attorney's work product or material
prepared for litigation.194
A report to a claims agent should not be considered the work
product of an attorney within the purview of 3101(c).
By
narrowly construing this absolute privilege the courts could, in
effect, expand the range of discretion under 3101(d), and thus
provide a more flexible standard. It would seem advisable where
ambiguity exists for the courts to apply subsection (d). The
Revisers state that they have adopted the rule of Hicknian v.
Taylor 195 where the Supreme Court held that statements compiled
190 "The following shall not be obtainable unless the court finds that the
material can no longer be duplicated because of a change in conditions and
that withholding it will result in injustice or undue hardship."
CPLR
3101(d).
19144 Misc. 2d 97, 252 N.Y.S.2d 973 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
192 Id. at 99, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 975. See cases cited therein.

193 Ibid.
194 Cf. Babcock v. Jackson, 40 Misc. 2d 757, 243 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. Ct.
1963), wherein the court recognized a distinction between a statement taken
by a claims adjuster and one taken by an attorney. "The attorney . . .
in taking a statement, is preparing his case and is working on a legal
theory. Contrary to this, claims agents are making routine investigations
for the company's records and are not preparing only for trial." Id. at 761,
243 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
195 329 U.S. 495 (1947).

